In this paper, we use daily closing data on CBOE options of 30 stocks during February through July of 1999 to investigate whether options open interest contains information that can be used for trading purposes. Individual stock price at option maturity is first predicted based on the distribution of options open interest. Several stock only and stock plus options directional trading strategies are then considered after comparing the predicted stock price at maturity and the actual stock price at the trade initiation date. In our sample, these trading strategies generate better returns compared to the S&P 500, the buy and hold strategy involving the sample stocks and the Merton et al (1978) style covered call strategy. Our empirical evidence thus indicates that non-price measures of activity in the derivatives market such as the open interest contain information about the future level of the underlying asset. This lends support to prior works (such as Copeland and Galai (1983) , and Easley et al (1998)) that suggest that the derivatives cannot be considered redundant in a market with information-related frictions. One implication is that the distribution of non-price derivatives market activity may be helpful for other purposes where the physical instead of the risk-neutral distribution of the underlying asset is needed. These include beta estimation, volatility forecasting and volatility trading.
DO PRICES AND TRADING ACTIVITY in security markets provide information about future price movements? If so, can this information be used to generate trading gains? While these questions have long generated significant interest among researchers and practitioners alike, the existence and growth of derivatives such as options have added new and interesting issues to this arena. The derivatives constitute an additional means for the informed traders to trade on their information and others to discover that information. Not only the derivatives may lead the underlying assets in impounding information, they may in fact provide information that simply cannot be inferred from the markets in underlying assets. Further, there are measures of trading activity, e.g., open interest, that are unique to the derivatives markets and as such provide a novel way to examine the informational role of financial markets.
In this paper, we examine the role of options market open interest in conveying information about the future movement of the underlying asset. More specifically, we use the open interest of short term equity options to predict the stock price at maturity and show empirically that trading strategies based on this predictor yield better returns than the buy-and-hold and passive covered call strategies. Thus, according to our study, (unique measure of) activity in the equity options market seems to contain information about future stock price that can be exploited for trading purposes. In principle, this information can also be helpful in other applications where the physical or true distribution of the underlying asset is needed.
Financial economists have long been interested in the process of price formation when informed traders, uninformed liquidity (or noise) traders and market makers interact in the asset market. 1 With the introduction of options market, informed traders as well as liquidity traders have an additional means to meet their trading needs. In fact, informed traders may find the options market more lucrative than the stock market due to lower transaction costs, less capital outlays, higher leverage, limited loss potential and lesser trading restrictions (e.g., no up tick rule for shorting). 2 If informed traders do choose to trade in the options market, not only the option prices 1 In an asymmetric information environment, informed traders may profit at the cost of noise or liquidity traders' loss (Copeland and Galai (1983) ). Continued trading of the informed investors can, however, serve as signals to the other (uninformed) market participants who can learn the underlying information in a Bayesian fashion and trade accordingly (Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , Easley and O'Hara (1987) , Kyle (1985) ). This possibility of multiple rounds of trade arises if the first trade of the informed traders does not instantly reveal the new information. Although the implications for the price paths, volume changes and trading strategies are different, informationmotivated trading may also be driven by differential information (He and Wang (1995) ) or differential interpretation of the same information (Copeland(1976) ) by informed traders.
and options market activity become relevant in impounding the information and its subsequent discovery, 3 options could in fact lead the underlying stock in terms of price change and trading activity. An impressive literature has emerged researching this and other related issues although the empirical evidence appears inconclusive. 4 While much attention has been paid to the information content of derivative prices, theoretical research on the information content of derivatives market activity about the future movement of the underlying asset is only beginning to emerge. 5 This line of research is mainly due to Easley et al (1998) . They present an asymmetric information based theory where the informed investors engage in specific trades in call and put options depending on the direction (positive or negative) of their information. The volume of these directional option trades conveys information to other market participants and thus ultimately impacts the underlying asset price. In their empirical 3 Under asymmetric information, information may flow from the option market to the underlying asset market. This has important implications for the underlying asset and its options. Grossman (1988) suggests that under asymmetric information traded derivatives are not the same as their synthetic counterparts due to their differential information content. While Detemple and Selden (1991) argue that information asymmetry may alter the hedging opportunities and as such impact the underlying asset price, Back (1993) examines the impact on option prices. Biais and Hillion (1994) show that the price volatility of the underlying asset may be affected by information asymmetry. Brennan and Cao (1996) , on the other hand, show that in a noisy rational expectations equilibrium, option trades may not be information based. 4 Using the Black-Scholes model, Manaster and Rendleman (1982) jointly imply the stock price and volatility from the observed daily closing option prices and find support for the incremental information content of options based on returns from ex post and ex ante trading strategies. Using the Berkley transaction data on options, Bhattacharya (1987) also finds incremental information content of options although the trading benefits seem marginal. Vijh (1988) questions the ex post results based on daily closing prices due to the bias arising from the nonsynchroneity of closing stock and option trades and the bid-ask bounce. Anthony (1988) uses volumes of options bracketing the daily closing price and find that for 64% of the sample stocks the options volume led the stock volume in a Granger Causality sense. However, about 48% cases are statistically significant in both univariate and multivariate causality tests. Stephan and Whaley (1990) , on the other hand, find stocks to lead their options both in terms of intra-day price change and trading activity. Chan, Chung, and Johnson (1993) argue that Stephan and Whaley's results are due to different price discreteness rules in the stock and option markets. Examining how option prices move with option trades, Vijh (1990) concludes that option trades are not information-driven while Srinivas (1993) attributes Vijh's results to a sample selection bias. Sheikh and Ronn (1994) attributes unique patterns of returns in the options market to information-based trading there. John, Koticha and Subrahmanyam (1993) and John, Koticha, Narayanan and Subrahmanyam (2000) show that the impact of options trading depends on the margin and liquidity constraints faced by the informed and uninformed or liquidity traders. Mayhew, Sarin and Shastri (1995) find that a reduced equity options writing margin increases the bid-ask spread of the optioned stocks and that the uninformed traders are more liquidity constrained than the informed traders. This evidence goes against the prevalence of information traders in the options market. 5 The general equilibrium analysis of Leisen and Judd (2001) provides insights as to how open interests are determined along with the option prices for various strikes in an incomplete markets setting. In their paper, agents have heterogeneous risk preferences but homogeneous probability beliefs about the underlying assets. As such, derivatives market activity (the distribution of open interests) is not informative about the future of the risky asset. study of 50 stocks with most actively traded options on the CBOE during October and November of 1990, Easley et al (1998) find that indeed the volume of directional option trades leads the stock price changes although the total option volume has no such predictive power. This shows that the pattern of derivatives market activity may contain information about the future movement of the underlying asset.
It is worthwhile to look at some of the assumptions underlying the theoretical model of Easley et al (1998) . First, informed traders are assumed to know the true value of the asset.
Regardless of their risk preference, the informed investors would then choose an investment strategy that maximizes profit barring any wealth constraint. It is, however, more realistic that the informed investors instead acquire signals with noise about the true value. In that case, it is not clear if the best strategy as outlined by Easley et al (1998) would stay the same. In particular, if the informed investors were risk averse, the strategy with maximum expected profit might not be the best choice. This leads to a change in optimal investment strategy when the wealth constraints such as those arising from margin requirements become binding.
Second, Easley et al (1998) assumes that all informed traders have the same information or signal and they interpret the signal in the same manner. As such, all informed investors undertake the same strategy (positive information or negative information). In practice, investors are more likely to have diverse (less than perfectly correlated) signals and/or differential interpretation of the same signal. Accordingly, we may have a distribution of positions by the informed traders within the same market (asset or options). Further, recent theoretical research (Back, Cao, and Willard (2000)) shows that the asset price process may be affected by the nature of signal distribution and competition among the informed traders.
Third, as is traditional in the asymmetric information literature, Easley et al (1998) assume away the impact of adverse movements in the broader market on the asset in question. Suppose the asset specific information is positive. However, if the asset is high beta, it may in fact go down with the market in case negative information or event hits the broad market. To guard against such possibilities, the informed investors might pursue limited risk rather than outright naked or speculative positions suggested by Easley et al (1998) . For example, a covered call strategy involves selling some call options although the asset-specific information is positive. Accordingly, "sell" call option orders does not necessarily mean a "negative" information trade.
Fourth, in their empirical study, Easley et al (1998) implicitly assumes that all option trades are opening trades. In fact, some of the trades may relate to closing down previously opened positions by the informed traders. Instead of "positive" or "negative" information, if at all these trades might indicate no further directional information as the previous information has likely been reflected in the asset price.
Lastly, while Easley et al (1998) and the extant research have primarily considered information about the future level of the underlying asset, Cherian and Vila (1997) , Cherian (1998) , and Cherian and Weng (1998) argue that investors may also have private information about the volatility of the underlying asset. In that case, they can directly trade on their information only in the options market. The identification of option orders with the "direction" of information in the Easley et al (1998) study is thus confounded by the volatility trades in options. Also, the pricing of options by the market maker and thus the determination of the best strategy by the directional trader may be affected. Moreover, since volatility-information can only flow from the options to the underlying asset market, the study of Easley et al (1998) and others are biased towards finding the options market to lead the underlying asset market.
In principle, private information may concern not just the mean and volatility but other higher order moments or the entire true probability distribution of the underlying asset when this distribution cannot be adequately captured by the lower order moments. Theoretical work to formalize such complex informational environments remains a daunting task, especially in the area of option pricing. At a practical level, however, it seems reasonable that options market activity should reflect the trading and thus belief of the variously informed traders about the future movement of the underlying asset. This is the fundamental premise of our empirical study of the information content of options open interest. While we do not provide any theory in this regard, we hope our empirical evidence will stimulate further research in this area.
The contribution of our paper can be summarized as follows. In this paper, we focus on directional trading strategies alone for a learner investor who does not have any private information. Based on the distribution of options open interest for a given maturity, the learner investor predicts the stock price at that maturity. A comparison of the current stock price and the predicted price then leads to trading strategies involving the stock and its options.
We find that the open interest based price predictor has good accuracy. The prediction accuracy is not due to accuracy only in specific option month or trade initiation day. Importantly, in our sample, the open interest based active trading strategies generate better returns compared to the passive benchmarks (buying and holding the stock, investing in the S&P 500, and pursuing Merton et al (1978) type covered call strategy). The magnitude of the return advantage seems too high to be nullified by any risk disadvantage there may be due to the use of a rough proxy for risk in this paper.
Our empirical evidence thus suggests that equity options open interest contain information about the future movement of the stock price.
Second, the information implied from derivative prices is about the risk-neutral distribution of the underlying asset. This information is certainly useful in many ways (such as hedging, pricing other derivatives of the same asset, identification of misvaluation, etc.). However, in many other applications (e.g., portfolio optimization and performance evaluation, estimation of beta or other higher order measures of risk, estimation of cost of capital, etc.), it is the true or physical distribution of the asset that is of interest. Since we only observe a single price of the asset at a time (or the bidask), traditionally researchers and practitioners use some form of time series data on the asset to estimate its physical distribution. 6 This approach is reliable and economical when the underlying distribution shows negligible time variation. Further, if the underlying asset price does not move very much, then it becomes statistically challenging to estimate the underlying distribution based on the time series of the asset price.
The open interest based approach offers an alternative means to estimate the underlying physical distribution of the asset. Potentially rich set of cross-sectional data on derivatives market activity (options open interest and volume of various strike prices and maturity) that is available simultaneously at a given point in time can be used for this purpose. The reliability of this approach of course depends on the information content of derivatives market activity. Our empirical evidence in this regard is quite positive and as such we are hopeful that our approach can be enhanced to further improve the estimation of the true distribution from derivatives market activity. For one thing, our approach is quite flexible in terms of updating the distribution. It is also non-parametric and model-free in that no model specification is needed for the underlying asset dynamics or for the derivatives price dynamics.
Third, for traders who decide not to engage in private information acquisition, we offer a new set of profitable trading strategies that rely on learning (almost free of cost) from the derivatives market (and not prices). The profitability of course depends on the informed traders deciding to trade in the derivatives market. Recent research lends support to such behavior of informed traders. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section I, we present the model for open interest based stock price predictor. This is followed by description of the data and the methodology in Section II. In Section III, we outline the various trading strategies and the associated payoff patterns for our hypothetical learner investor. The empirical evidence on the comparative performance of the various passive and active strategies are then presented in Section IV. Summary and conclusions are drawn in Section V.
I. The Prediction Model for Stock Price at Maturity
Consider an equity instrument, or stock, for which there is a set of call and put options maturing at T, the current time being T 0 . Let the price of the stock at time t be S t . Let {X i , i =1,2,….,K} be the set of strike prices for call options and {X l , l=1,2,…,L} be the set of strike prices for put options. The payoff at maturity to the buyer of a call option with a strike price X i is The key premise of our work is that investors take option positions driven by their trading needs. These needs are dictated by their beliefs about future equilibrium stock price or its physical distribution based on private and public information available to them at the time. 7 The nature of option market activity should thus contain information regarding consensus about future stock price movements, in particular about the distribution of stock price at maturity. The consensus, however, reflects the opinions of traders who chose to trade in the options market to meet their specific trading objectives.
It is possible that the option prices are also materially and systematically (by strike or maturity) affected by the option trading needs of the investor population as typically is the case in incomplete financial markets. 8 Options then cannot be considered as truly derivatives of the underlying stock. This is because when non-redundant options are traded, they may provide information about the underlying stock and as such end up affecting the stock price and its dynamics. 9 Consequently the standard option pricing models that assume invariance of the stock price and its dynamics to options trading do not apply. 10 An important implication is that the practice of equating the model 7 We thus visualize the financial markets environment to be characterized by possible combinations of the following: asymmetric information, differential private information or differential interpretation of same public information, learning by the uninformed traders, hedging or insurance needs, and learning by the uninformed traders. 8 Detemple and Murthy (1994) shows that in an economy with heterogeneous but rationally updated beliefs, while the structure of intertemporal general equilibrium asset prices remain the same as under homogeneous beliefs, the price levels and their dynamics are indeed affected by heterogeneity of beliefs. Detemple and Selden (1991) considers a one-period general equilibrium model with a risky stock and two classes of investors with diverse beliefs about the risk of the stock payoff. They show that when option is introduced, it is traded (bought by high risk perception investor and sold by low risk perception investor) in a noisy rational expectations equilibrium and ends up changing (increasing) the stock price as the investor-specific demand for the stock changes. A further informational effect on the stock price is generated as the investors condition their beliefs on the option price as well. 9 For example, Back (1993) finds that the perceived conditional density of the terminal stock price may be bimodal under asymmetric information. Back considers the impact of information asymmetry in a market microstructure model of Kyle (1985) to include a call option. With one risk-neutral informed trader, some uninformed liquidity traders and market makers, options trading creates a stochastic volatility framework leading to an imperfect correlation between the stock and the option. Not only Black-Scholes type option pricing no longer prevails, option orders in fact convey different information than stock orders. For example, a call option buy order increases the probability of option expiring in-the-money disproportionately more than a stock buy order 10 An extensive empirical literature exists on the effect of equity options introduction on the underlying stocks. According to Conrad (1989) , Detemple and Jorion (1990) , Kim and Young (1991) , earlier equity options introductions led to an increase in the price of the optioned stocks. Such benefits are, however, not visible for later option listings and may in fact have reversed into negative impacts (Sorescu (2000) ). A number of studies (e.g., Conrad (1989) , Skinner (1989) , Damodaran and Lim (1991) ) find option listings to stabilize the variance but having no impact on the beta. The variance effect in the US market is by no means uncontested. In the Canadian market, Elfakhani and Chaudhury (1995) The price predictor COP can thus be viewed as an expected terminal stock price where the expectation is with respect to the time t discrete distribution of the open interests for all call options variance effect however reverses following the later option listings. While Conrad (1989) and Kim and Young (1991) find no impact of the US listing of put options on the optioned stocks, Elfakhani and Chaudhury (1995) and Chaudhury and Elfakhani (1997) report Canadian evidence that supports a risk reduction effect associated with put option listings. 
optimistic the informed investors are, the distribution of their buy positions will shift further to higher strikes (deeper out calls). This will tend to increase the weight for higher strike call options.
An alternative option strategy for the optimistic informed investors is to sell in-the-money put options. This will tend to increase the weights for higher strike put options. In either case, higher weights for the higher strikes will result in a higher price predictor, consistent with the optimism of the informed investors.
Further, since the information is only probabilistic and new information later may negate the earlier positive information, the optimistic investors may decide to hedge against potential downside movement by buying some out-of-the-money (strike lower than the current stock price) put options.
Higher the risk of information reversal and greater the perceived potential shift towards poorer prospects, the insurative put buying will tend to attach more weight to the lower strike put options and will end up attenuating the price predictor.
Since we do not expect the optimistic informed investors to take positions in in-the-money call options, 13 we should still end up with a positive bias in the price predictor due to the combined higher weights for the higher strikes (bought out-of-the-money calls and/or sold in-the-money puts) as opposed to the lower strikes (bought insurative out-of-the-money puts). Now consider another group of informed investors whose information happen to be negative or who interprets the same information negatively. A likely speculative strategy for these pessimistic informed investors is to buy out-of-the-money (lower strike) put options. The more pessimistic they are, the greater will be their influence on the weight of the deeper out-of-the-money put options. Alternatively, they may also sell in-the-money (lower strike) call options. In either case, their open positions will tend to lower the level of the price predictor, consistent with the negative information of this group of investors. Of course, these investors also face the risk of information reversal and may hedge against a sharp run up by buying deep out-of-the-money (higher strike) calls.
Since the pessimistic informed investors are not likely to sell in-the-money (lower strike) put options, their net influence is expected to be negative on the price predictor via the combined weights of lower strike put options bought and/or lower strike call options sold.
In addition to the informed investors, optimistic and pessimistic, there are liquidity traders and uninformed speculators. Their option actions are expected to be random and hence constitute a source of forecast error for the price predictor. Since information arrival can be sequential, it is also possible that the open interests reflect positions undertaken by learners. The learners, however, have to infer the potentially conflicting signals of the optimistic and the pessimistic informed traders.
Their inference errors would also add noise to the option market activity and thus the price predictor.
It is the perspective of a new learner that we assign to our hypothetical investor in this paper.
This learner attempts to learn from the publicly available distribution of the open interests over various strike prices, constructs the price predictor, S t Z , and trades accordingly either in the stock market alone or both in the stock market and the options market. These trading strategies are delineated in the next section and their simulated performance is evaluated thereafter.
II. Data and Methodology

A. Data
The daily closing call and put options data (price and open interest by strike) used in this study was collected from the online delayed quote reporting system of Dreyfus Brokerage Services (DBS). These quotes are derived from the Market Data Report of the Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE). 14 Our sample period spans the six consecutive option months of February, March, April, May, June, and July of 1999. We define an option month as the period between the two consecutive option expiration dates. For example, the February option month extends from the first day of trading after the options expiration date in January to the last day of trading before the options expiration date in February. 15 Our sample consists of thirty popularly held companies chosen from the NASDAQ and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). A list of these companies and the sectors that they represent are provided in Table I . These companies were selected to represent major market indexes, a cross section of important sectors and active options trading on the CBOE. The distribution by index is as follows: DJIA (11), S&P 500 (7), NASDAQ 100 (7), NASDAQ Composite (3) and DJTA (2).
The sample firms represent seven broad sectors: technology (11), services (10), consumer products (3), basic materials (2), conglomerates (2), energy (1) and healthcare (1).
14 We cross-checked the DBS data against the CBOE data available online and found no major discrepancies. 15 The options expiration date in any calendar month is usually the third Friday of the calendar month. In case, the third Friday is a holiday, we use the last trading day before expiration as the last day of the option month. Table II gives For all strategies, positions are established using the closing prices of a trade initiation day (t) within an option month and the positions are liquidated using the closing prices on the last day of trading (T) during the option month. Thus, options that are permissible for trading have less than thirty calendar days to expiration. Within an option month, we allow trades to be initiated on four trading days: the second Monday (2M), the second Friday (2F), the Friday before the expiration Friday (LF) and the last Monday, i.e., the Monday of the expiration week (EXM). 16 Thus, the corresponding holding periods in terms of calendar days are about 20 days (2M), 14 days (2F), 7 days (LF) and 4 days (EXM).
We chose to study short (less than a month) holding periods since information nowadays circulate quite rapidly due to the explosive growth of internet usage specially among the investing population. As such, learning has become easier and faster and information based trading is expected to impound the information into prices without significant delays. Also, active traders tend to have a short horizon. The 2M trade initiation day is chosen to allow about a week of option trading during the option month following the last expiration, so it allows a week of learning or digesting the option market activity information by the active traders. The 2F is midway through the option month while the LF allows the option market activity to start reflecting the trades of informed traders based on the large amount of macro, industry and company statistics that are typically compiled around the turn of the month. Lastly, we include the EXM trade initiation day to pick up any information-based peculiarity of the weekend before expiration or potential last minute strategic trading moves by the market participants.
We allow a sum of around $10,000 to be invested in a given stock and/or its options on a given trade initiation day. Since an option contract is for 100 shares, we had to undertake some rounding (to be discussed later) to determine the number of contracts and shares that could be traded. As a result, the investment sum for a stock (I) could be different from $10,000 in some strategies involving stock and options. Once the positions are established based on the distribution of open interests and using the closing stock and option prices for trade implementation, they are held till the end of the option month.
Under each strategy, for each stock, first, the dollar profit or return (Π) is estimated using the closing stock and option prices on the trade initiation day and the option maturity date. In calculating the dollar return we assume a zero transaction cost for the stock trading, $30 for one-way option trading and zero transaction cost for option exercises. Second, for each stock, the holding period percentage return on investment (PROI) for the strategy is calculated based on the dollar return and the estimated investment (around $10,000). The performance of a strategy is then measured as the (cross-sectional) average of the percentage return on investment with respect to the thirty sample stocks. Whenever possible and appropriate, we also present the cross-sectional standard deviation of PROI as a proxy for the risk or volatility of returns on a strategy.
Further, for a small number of stocks, there were major news events after the trade initiation day (prior to the next option expiration date) during our sample period. Following these events, the stock price often moved significantly and seemingly against recent stock trend. When this happens, the expiration day actual stock price may end up being widely different from the open interest based predictor. If prior to the news event, the stock was trending up and the open interest based predictor was also signaling an upward move, then it is more reasonable to assume that any negative information pertaining to the news event came as a surprise to all investors.
To see the impact of these news shocks on the relative performance of the active strategies, we estimated two sets of results for the open interest based active strategies. One set of results assume that our hypothetical investor did not have a clue that news shocks are coming for some of the stocks and hence established positions in all thirty stocks using the pre-news open interest based predictor and the pre-news closing prices on trade initiation day. We call this portfolio the IN (Ignore News) portfolio. The second set of results assumes that our hypothetical learner investor had guessed correctly the stocks for which the news shocks were coming. However, our investor did not know the nature (positive or negative) of the news shocks. Since we restrict the investor to directional trading only, in the second set of results we assume that our hypothetical investor did not establish positions with respect to the stocks on the trade initiation day. The performance of an active strategy in this case is the average PROI on the positions with respect to the remaining nonevent stocks. We refer to this portfolio as the CN (Consider News) portfolio. Of course, we would expect the PROI to be higher for the CN portfolio.
It turned out that even for the longest holding period in our sample, only one to two of the thirty sample stocks had major news events that led to a significant divergence between the performance of the strategy (for the stocks in news) ignoring and considering the news. Considering the portfolio of all the stocks, the performance ranking of the various strategies remained by and large the same. Further, we only consider a sample of thirty stocks. For active institutional investors, it is likely that the portfolio would involve many more stocks and as such portfolio performance perturbations due to stock-specific news events would tend to average out. Therefore, while we present some evidence regarding the effect of the news events, most of the empirical evidence for the active strategies is presented using the CN portfolio. The generic name that we use for the active portfolios in presenting the results is OPP. If not mentioned otherwise, OPP would thus represent the CN results in the empirical evidence section.
III. Trading Strategies
In this section, we shall delineate the specifics of the trading strategies with respect to a given stock that our hypothetical learner investor may follow. These strategies are respectively the passive buyand-hold (stock only) strategy, Merton et al type covered call (stock plus option) strategies, open interest based active strategy using only stock, and open interest based limited risk active strategies using stock plus options.
A. Passive Buy and Hold Strategy (Stock Only)
For a given stock, the buy-and-hold strategy simply involves buying shares at the closing price of the trade initiation day. The number of shares bought is determined by dividing the total dollar amount to be invested ($10,000) by the closing stock price on the trade initiation day and rounding to the closest integer if necessary. It is assumed that investors are not allowed to borrow securities on margin, and the risk free interest rate is assumed to be zero as the interest up to three weeks is inconsequential. We do not consider brokerage fees for stock trading since many discount brokers charge as low as ten dollars or less.
The expected dollar returns for the buy-and-hold strategy for a stock is:
where, S T is the closing stock price at the option maturity date, S t is the closing stock price on the trade initiation day, S N is the number of shares bought, and I is the net outlay. Here,
The percentage return on investment (PROI) is estimated as follows:
An equally weighted portfolio of all thirty stocks is then formed. We call this portfolio the naïve investor or NI portfolio. The holding period return on this portfolio is simply the average return on the thirty stocks from the specific trade initiation day to the end of the option month.
B. Merton et al (Passive) Covered call strategy
A covered call strategy differs from a buy-and-hold strategy in that the dollar loss on the stock is reduced by the option premium received and the dollar gains on the stock are capped by the strike price (if the written call is out-of-the-money when the position is initiated). Thus, ex ante, compared to the buy-and-hold strategy, the covered call strategy has lower return potential and less 
where, C it , is the closing price of the call option with strike X i on the trade initiation day and T C is the total transaction cost for the call option transactions, and N S /100 = N C is the number of call option contracts written and is equal to $10,000/S t rounded to the nearest integer. Since option trades incur a fixed ordering cost plus a per contract transaction cost, T C can be significant percentage wise for orders of small value.
The initial investment required on a fully covered position, I CC , is given by:
The percentage return on investment (PROICC) is estimated as follows:
Three different equally weighted portfolios are formed using the covered call positions of the thirty individual stocks. These portfolios are named OMP (out-of-the-money calls written), AMP (at-the-money or nearest-to-the-money calls written) and IMP (in-the-money calls written). The portfolio return is just the average return on the thirty individual stocks' covered call positions.
C. Open Interest Based Active Strategy (Stock Only)
At the close of a trade initiation day, t, our active investor estimates the expected terminal [ ]
We are assuming that whether the stock is bought or sold short, the investor has to deposit the equivalent of trade value with the broker. In our case, this amount is $10,000, i.e., the assumed investment sum. Thus, our active stock investment strategy, like the buy and hold strategy, assumes no margin buying of the stock and 100% margin requirement for short selling.
When we present the empirical results, we shall mostly rely on the average percentage return on the active strategy with respect to the thirty individual stocks in our sample. This means that the average percentage return will reflect the returns from active long positions in some stocks and active 
D. Open Interest Based Active Strategy (Stock Plus Options)
The open interest based active stock strategy can be quite risky for individual stocks. We, therefore, consider limited risk active strategies involving stocks and options. As in the active stock strategy, on each trade initiation day t, our investor compares the actual closing stock price S t and the open interest based price predictor S t Z . Here, however, the investor considers the magnitude as well as the direction of predicted price movement. Suppose X is the next available strike price in the direction of the predicted price movement. It is considered a major price movement if S t Z either goes past X or at least is closer to X than it is to the current stock price S t . Otherwise, it is categorized as a minor price movement. By and large, the cases identified as major (minor) price movements in our sample represented a predicted change of more (less) than 5% (2%) from the current stock price.
According to the direction and the magnitude of the predicted stock price movement, we have the following four cases:
The price predictor signals a minor upward movement in the stock.
ASP2:
The price predictor signals a major upward movement in the stock.
ASP3:
The price predictor signals a minor downward movement in the stock.
ASP4:
The price predictor signals a major downward movement in the stock.
We shall now discuss the four cases above and the active trading strategies our investor will follow under these cases.
D.1 ASP1: The Price Predictor Signals a Minor Upward Movement in the Stock
If the price predictor indicates a minor upside for a stock, our investor buys the stock at the closing market price on the trade initiation day and writes a call option. The strike price of the written call option is chosen based on the upside potential indicated by the price predictor and the availability of strike prices. If, for example, the current stock price is $55, the predicted stock price at maturity is $57 and the available strike price that is immediately higher than $57 is $60, we consider this as a minor upside from the current stock price of $55. Accordingly, our investor writes a covered call at the strike price of $60.
The dollar returns for the strategy ASP1 is given by the following equation:
Here the symbol "≅" means closest to S t Z in the direction of the predicted price movement.
The initial investment required for the strategy ASP1, is given by:
And the percentage return on investment (PROIASP1) is estimated as follows:
I PROIASP (10) In the equations above, N S =N C x100, is the number of shares that can be purchased with $10,000 rounded to the nearest 100. This is because in order to write one fully covered call option contract, the investor needs to have 100 shares. For the sake of convenience, we allow the investor to buy 200 shares and write 2 call contracts if the number of shares that could be purchased with $10,000 is 180. Therefore, the actual net investment could be higher or lower than $10,000. The percentage return, PROIASP1, is calculated on the net investments If the stock does move up but does so substantially (not expected), the return from the strategy ASP1 will be positive but less than the active stock strategy AS (long). However, if the stock stays roughly the same, moves up but not beyond the chosen strike for the written call, or in fact drops a little, then the strategy ASP1 may still provide a positive return that is greater than the return from the strategy AS (long). If the stock moves down by more than the net proceeds from the written call, the return from ASP1 will be negative but it will not be as bad as the return from the strategy AS (long). Overall, the strategy ASP1 provides better return prospect than the strategy AS (long) except when the stock makes a major upward move unexpectedly. In the empirical section later in this paper, we report the cross-sectional (across the sample stocks) average as well as the standard deviation of the various strategies. Based on these ex-post measures, if we find a better risk-return tradeoff for an active strategy compared to a passive strategy, then we can feel more confident about the ex ante superiority of the active strategy.
D.2 ASP2: The Price Predictor Signals a Major Upward Movement in the Stock
If the price predictor indicates a major upside for a stock, as in strategy ASP1 our investor pursues a limited risk active covered call strategy. The investor buys the stock at the closing market price on the trade initiation day and sells a deep-out-of-the-money (significantly higher strike) call option; the strike is chosen based on the upside potential indicated by the price predictor and the availability of strike prices. If, for example, the predicted stock price at maturity is $64, signaling a major upside from the current stock price of $55, our investor writes a covered call at strike around 65. If, on the other hand, the predicted stock price at maturity were $61 or even $59, still signaling a major upside according to our classification, the chosen strike would have been $60.
The dollar return, the investment and the percentage return for the strategy ASP2 are then as in equations (8), (9) and (10) . This, however, will only make sense if the premium received for the deep-out-of-the-money calls written exceeds the options transaction cost. Since the options in our sample have less than one month to expiration, when the predictor signals a major upward movement, we find some instances where the closing option price of the prescribed strike is either too low or the contract had no trade on the initiation day t. In these circumstances, our hypothetical investor pursues a somewhat different bullish strategy. The investor now buys shares and at-themoney options costing a total of $10,000. Thus, here we have:
where C yi is the time t closing price of a call option with strike X yi ≅ S t . Since the premium for the deep-out-of-the-money (X yyi ≅ S t Z >> S t ) call option net of the transaction cost (when jointly ordered with the purchase of at-the-money call option) will be of relatively small magnitude, we continue to include the writing of the deep-out-of-the-money call option. The dollar return, the initial investment and the percentage return on ASP2 are then estimated as:
The purchase of at-the-money call options to partially replace the purchase of shares makes the strategy ASP2 more bullish (more leveraged) than when deep-out-of-the-money option premium exceeds the options transaction cost. However, the number of such cases is rather small and has no material impact on the overall (portfolio) returns of the strategy ASP2. Hence, for ASP2, we shall pretend from hereon that the option premium received is large enough to handily offset the transaction cost.
If the stock does move up as expected, the return from the strategy ASP2 will be positive and greater than both the active stock strategy AS (long) and the active covered call strategy ASP1
(where somewhat out-of-the-money call option is written). If the stock stays roughly the same, does not make a major upward move, or drops a little, then the strategy ASP2 may still provide a positive return that is greater than the return from the strategy AS (long). Although, under such circumstances, ASP1 would have yielded a greater return than ASP2 since the call premium received under ASP1 would have been higher. If the stock moves down by more than the net proceeds from the written call, the return from ASP2 will be negative but it will not be as bad as the return from the strategy AS (long). Overall, the strategy ASP2 provides better return prospect than the strategy AS (long) except when the stock makes a major upward move beyond the predicted price. In that case, AS (long) would outperform ASP2.
D.3 ASP3: The Price Predictor Signals a Minor Downward Movement in the Stock
If the price predictor indicates a minor downside for a stock, our investor writes a covered call at a strike near the closing stock price on the trade initiation day. If the stock goes down to the somewhat lower predicted level but not below, the loss on the long stock will be outweighed by premium received for the at-the-money call written assuming that the call premium is greater than the expected drop in the stock. In case the stock stays flat or moves up, there is no loss on the long stock as the investor either keeps the stock or gives it away at the strike close to the purchase price.
Meantime, the investor bags the call premium. The worst case for this strategy is when the stock drops significantly below the predicted level. In that case, the strategy ASP3 will lose money although the call premium cushions the loss to a degree.
If the investor instead went for short selling, the dollar gains would be more if the stock drops as predicted. However, not only the required investment is larger (due to the premium received under ASP3) relative to the strategy ASP3, the short selling strategy is destined to lose money if the stock moves up instead of moving down. The same is true for naked put buying. In other words, short selling and naked put buying are more volatile bearish alternatives than the strategy ASP3.
The dollar returns, the initial investment and the percentage return for the strategy ASP4 are given by the following equations:
In the above equations, Zi P is the price of the put option with strike Zi X and Vi C is the price of the call contract with strike Vi X . The transaction costs are T C for N C call option contracts written and N C = N S /100 where N S is $10,000/S t rounded to the nearest 100.
D.4 ASP4: The Price Predictor Signals a Major Downward Movement in the Stock
If the price predictor indicates a major downside for a stock, our investor writes a covered call at a strike close to the predicted stock price at maturity and buys a put option with the strike near or above the closing stock price on the trade initiation day. If the stock goes down to the predicted level or below, the loss from the long stock will be covered by the put option's payoff, the written call be worthless, and the net premium received (price of the in-the-money call written minus the price of the at-the-money put option bought) can be considered as profit. The net premium plus the put payoff would likely exceed any loss from the exercise of written call when the stock does not drop all the way to the predicted low price. In case the stock moves up, profit from the stock would offset further losses on the written call. The worst case for this strategy if the stock remains flat and the net premium is less than the intrinsic value of the written in-the-money call.
If the investor instead went for short selling, the dollar gains would be more if the stock does actually drop significantly as predicted. However, not only the required investment is larger (when the net premium is positive), the loss is also greater if the stock moves up instead of moving down. The same is true for naked put buying. In other words, short selling and naked put buying are more volatile bearish alternatives than the strategy ASP4. 
In the above equations, Zi P is the price of the put option with strike Zi X and Vi C is the price of the call contract with strike Vi X . The transaction costs are T C for N C call option contracts written and T C for N P put option contracts bought, and N C = N P = N S /100 where N S is $10,000/S t rounded to the nearest 100.
IV. Evidence on Comparative Performance
In this section, we first discuss (Table III) how the active strategy performs for a given option month and trade initiation day and compare this with the naïve investor's buy and hold strategy. Second, the prediction accuracy of the open interest based price predictor is analyzed (Table IV) . Third, the comparative performance results for the various option months and trade initiation days are reported for the various passive and active strategies (Table V) 
A. How Does the Active Strategy Perform?: An Example
To obtain a sense of how the active positions are established and aggregated to arrive at portfolio results, Table III While we have not presented any risk measure in Table III and the table concerns only one initiation day in one option month, it seems that the return advantage of the active strategy compared to the buy and hold strategy is quite convincing. Thus there is preliminary indication that options open interest contain information about future stock movement that can be used for profitable trading. The volatility of the active strategy returns relative to the volatility of the buy and hold returns have to be quite high for nullifying the active strategy's attractiveness.
B. How Accurate is the (Up or Down) Prediction of the Open Interest Based Predictor?
In Table III , we see that while the stock only active strategy did have a mean return advantage during the two-week period of the February 1999 option month, the up or down predictions for the sample individual stocks were not always right. If the return advantage arises due to accurate prediction in only a minority of stocks and only in a few months, then the strategy may not be reliable for replication in general. We now, therefore, look at the prediction (up or down)
accuracy of the open interest based predictor in the six option months in our sample considering all four trade initiation days within an option month. Since there are thirty stocks in our sample, we have a total of 120 cases of prediction in each of the six option months.
In the three option months of February (59%), April (70%) and May (65%), a majority of the sample stocks actually lost their value during the holding periods. On the other hand, in the option months of March (53%), June (77%) and July (63%), a majority of the sample stocks actually marched higher during the holding periods. Thus, loosely speaking we might refer to February, April and May as the "down" option months in our sample and to March, June and July as the "up" option months.
In comparison, our option based predictor calls for a "down" option month in all option months except June. Thus there seems to be a downward bias in our open interest based prediction. This is somewhat expected as our prediction method is solely based on the stock-specific open interest of options and does not take into account any market wide factor, nor does it predict up or down for a portfolio of stocks. We also ignore volume and recent changes in the open interest that might have contributed to the prediction error.
Let us now look at the percentage of cases the open interest based prediction was correct.
Of the cases the prediction was "up", it proved to be a correct call in 67% (February), 50% (March), 54% (April), 55% (May), 77% (June) and 87% (July) of the cases. Of the cases the prediction was "down", it proved to be a correct call in 60% (February), 45% (March), 80% (April), 81% (May), 24% (June) and 56% (July) of the cases. Averaging over the six option months, the accuracy of the "up" prediction is 65% and that of the "down" prediction is 58%. Thus, the "up" predictions may appear more accurate than the "down" predictions. But in the "down" option months (February, April and May) when a majority of sample stocks suffered loss, the accuracy of "down" prediction is 60%, 80% and 81% respectively, averaging to 74% accuracy. In contrast, in the "up" option months (March, June and July) when a majority of sample stocks marched higher, the accuracy of "up" prediction is 50%, 77% and 87% respectively, averaging to 71% accuracy.
We, therefore, conclude that the prediction accuracy of the open interest based predictor is reasonably good. The overall prediction accuracy is not due to accuracy only in specific option month or trade initiation day. In other words, our evidence so far lends broad support to the information content of the options open interest.
C. Comparative Performance Results
Lastly, Table V Considering all 120 cases of prediction, a passive investor investing in the S&P 500 would have earned 1.53% return on average. If the passive investor followed the equally-weighted buy and hold strategy, the average return would have been 1.00%. Considering that the average holding period is about 11 to 12 days, these returns translate to about 49% annualized return for the S&P 500 and about 32% annualized return for the equally weighted portfolio of the thirty blue chip sample stocks. Given that 1999 was a stellar year for stocks, these returns appear realistic. did not arise due to better performance in just one or two months or for just one or two specific trade initiation days can be observed from the detailed performance numbers in Table V . Whichever stock only strategy (S&P 500, NI, AS) earned the highest return in a given option month for a given trade initiation day is highlighted in Table V . For example, the AS strategy had the highest return in 16 of the 24 option month/ trade initiation day combinations and these cases are well spread over the various months and trade initiation days.
One might wonder whether the much enhanced performance of the stock only active strategy comes at the cost of significantly higher risk or volatility. As a proxy for risk or volatility, we also present in Table V the cross-sectional standard deviation (in italics) of holding period return. On average, the standard deviation of the AS strategy return is 22.64% while that of the buy and hold strategy is 25.07%.
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This gives us confidence that the return advantage of the active strategy will not be washed away by a significantly higher risk.
Let us now turn to the limited risk strategies. After all, our learner investor is subject to the risk of gleaning incorrect information from the distribution of options open interest and as such may hedge a bit by undertaking limited risk directional speculation instead of naked speculation (as in the active stock only strategy above). The benchmark that we use for the limited risk strategies is the Merton et al (1978) type covered call strategy. Since this strategy provides no guidance for the selection of the strike for the written call option, it can be considered a passive limited risk strategy.
In contrast, although our stock plus option strategy also uses covered call, the strike of the written call is carefully chosen according to the direction and the magnitude of stock price movement
predicted by the open interest based price predictor.
In aggregate, the passive covered call strategy earns 1.96% (OMP: out-of-the-money call written), 2.43% (AMP: at-the-money call written) and 2.14% (IMP: in-the-money call written). In sharp contrast, our stock plus options limited risk active strategy (ASP) earns 11.20%. Once again, the advantage of the active strategy is not due to return advantage in particular option month or for a given trade initiation day. This advantage prevails in 21 out of the 24 option month/ trade initiation day combinations in our sample. Looking at the standard deviations, the risk of the limited risk active strategy appears consistently lower than that of the passive out-of-the-money covered call strategy. In general, the risk of the active strategy is greater compared to the risks of the passive at- 17 The standard deviation of the S&P 500 holding period return for a given option month/ trade initiation day combination cannot be calculated as it is a single number.
the-money and in-the-money covered call strategies. This is, of course, expected as our limited risk active strategies mostly involve writing out-of-the-money call options and as such their volatility is expected to be higher relative to the strategy of always writing at-or in-the-money call options.
Overall, the comparative performance results indicate an impressive trading advantage of predictions based on the distribution of options open interest. This advantage seems pervasive and does not seems to come at the cost of significantly higher risk.
V. Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we use daily closing data on CBOE options of 30 stocks during Not only the risk of the active strategies (naked and limited risk) seems close to the risk of the benchmarks, the magnitude of the return advantage seems too high to be nullified by any risk disadvantage there may be due to the use of a rough proxy for risk in this paper. We, therefore, conclude that the equity options open interest contains valuable information that is attractive for trading purposes.
Our evidence has important implications for researchers and practitioners. The information content of derivative market activity that we find in this paper lends support to a growing theoretical and empirical literature. Many (e.g., Copeland and Galai (1983) , Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , Kyle This paper shows one clear advantage of using derivatives market activity instead of prices to imply information. The information implied from the derivative prices is about the risk-neutral distribution of the underlying asset. While it is certainly useful in many applications, in many other applications it is the physical distribution of the asset that is of most interest. For example, in stock only portfolio optimization, the moments needed are those from the physical distribution. Similarly, practitioners interested in estimating the beta and the cost of capital will find information about the physical distribution more useful. In these and other applications where the physical distribution is of interest, the derivatives market activity measures may be quite helpful to the extent these activities do contain information about the physical distribution. It is with respect to this latter regard, this paper provides hope for future applications.
Lastly, it is to be mentioned that we considered only US equity options and only one measure of activity in this market, namely the open interest. It remains to be seen how the approach will work in the context of options on other assets (such as foreign exchange, fixed income, and commodity), derivatives of other types (such as futures and futures options) and derivatives traded in other countries.
Table I Sample Firms
The sample consists of the 30 firms representing various sectors with active CBOE options trading during February through July of 1999. For each stock, the table gives the stock trading ticker symbol, the sector it represents on the CBOE and the major index in which it was included at the time. 
Table III--Continued
If S t < S t Z , then the prediction or signal is an upward move (UP) for the stock from t to T and the hypothetical active investor goes long on the stock (BUY). If S t > S t Z , then the prediction is a down move (DOWN) for the stock from t to T and the hypothetical active investor goes short on the stock (SS). For each stock, the number of shares (N S ) bought or shorted is $10,000/ S t . We assume 100% margin deposit for both stock purchase and short selling. Stock transaction costs are assumed to be zero. The percentage return on investment (PROI) is calculated as 100x dollar return (Π)/ Investment (I). For the buy and hold strategy and the stock only active strategy, I is $10,000. For the buy and hold strategy and the long stock active strategy, Π= S T -S t per share. For the short stock active strategy, Π= S t -S T per share.
Portfolio type NI (Naïve Investor) indicates a strategy of buying on trade initiation day and holding till next option expiration day with respect to each of the thirty sample stocks. In the CN and IN portfolios, on the other hand, the hypothetical investor goes long (short) on the stock if the open interest based price predictor signals an UP (DOWN) market for the stock from the trade initiation day to the next option expiration day. The difference between CN (Consider News) and IN (Ignore News) is that IN includes active strategy positions in all stocks even if some of the stocks had major news events after trade initiation day that led to major swings in the stock price. CN, on the other hand, excludes the news event stocks and as such assumes that our directional trader had expected such news although the direction of the stock impact was not known.
Table IV Prediction (Up or Down) Performance of the Open Interest Based Price Predictor
This table reports the number and the percentage (in parentheses) of cases in which the sample stocks actually moved up (Actual Up) or down (Actual Down) from the four alternative trade initiation days to the option expiration day during the six option months of February through July of 1999. For example, the February 1999 option month runs from the first day of trading after option expiration in January 1999 to the last day of trading (T) before option expiration day in February 1999. Of the total 120 possible cases during this option month (4 holding periods for each of the 30 stocks), in 49 or 41% of the cases, the stocks actually moved up and in the remaining 71 or 59% of the cases the stocks actually moved down. This table also reports the number and percentage (in parentheses) of cases in which the sample stocks were predicted by the open interest based price predictor to move up (Predicted Up) or down (Predicted Down) from the four alternative trade initiation days to the option expiration day during the six option months of February Merton et al (1978) style covered call strategies (OMP: out-of-the-money call option written, AMP: at-the-money call option written, IMP: in-themoney call option written). The PROI on S&P 500 is also reported for the corresponding holding periods. For each strategy, the first row presents the cross-sectional average and the second row (in italics) presents the cross-sectional standard deviation of PROI across the sample stocks. The S&P 500 figures are just the holding period returns and not averages across the component stocks. The PROI is not annualized. The option months considered are the six consecutive option months from February 1999 to July 1999. For example, the February 1999 option month runs from the first day of trading after option expiration in January 1999 to the last day of trading (T) before option expiration day in February 1999. Within an option month, four alternative trade initiation days (start of a holding period), t, are considered. These are the second Friday of the option month (2F), the second Monday of the option month (2M), the Friday of the week preceding the option expiration week (LF) and the Monday of the option expiration week (EXM). The opening trades on t and the closing trades on T use the closing prices of stocks and options on those dates. The stock only active strategy is based on the directional (Upward or Downward) signal about stock price movement from to T. The signal is generated from a comparison of S t and S t Z , where S t Z is the open interest based prediction at t for S T . It is the weighted average of the strike prices that had open interest at t in call and/or put options maturing at T. The weight for a given strike price is the combined open interest of call and put options (maturing at T) at that strike price relative to the aggregate open interest of call and put options (maturing at T) of all strike prices. , then the prediction or signal is an upward move (UP) for the stock from t to T and the hypothetical active investor goes long on the stock (BUY). If S t > S t Z , then the prediction is a down move (DOWN) for the stock from t to T and the hypothetical active investor goes short on the stock (SS). For each stock, the number of shares (N S ) bought or shorted is $10,000/ S t . We assume 100% margin deposit for both stock purchase and short selling. Stock transaction costs are assumed to be zero. The percentage return on investment (PROI) is calculated as 100x dollar return (Π)/ Investment (I). For the buy and hold strategy and the stock only active strategy, I is $10,000. For the buy and hold strategy and the long stock active strategy, Π= S T -S t per share. For the short stock active strategy, Π= S t -S T per share. The stock plus options limited risk active strategy (ASP) is based on the direction (Upward or Downward) as well as the magnitude of stock price movement as predicted by the open interest based predictor S t Z . The magnitude is considered a major move if S t Z either goes past or at least is closer to the next available strike in the direction of the price move than it is to the current stock price S t . By and large, this meant a change of more than 5% in our sample. Minor moves mostly meant a change of less than 2% in our sample. If a flat to minor upward movement is predicted, the investor pursues ASP1: writes covered call with strike close to the predicted price. If a major upward movement is predicted, the investor pursues ASP2: writes covered call with strike close to the predicted price. However, if the call premium is not large enough, the strategy is instead to buy shares and at-the-money call options and write calls with strike close to the predicted price. If a minor downward movement is predicted, the investor pursues ASP3: writes a covered call with strike close to the current stock price. If the price predictor indicates a major downside for a stock, the investor pursues ASP4: writes a covered call at a strike close to the predicted stock price and buys a put option with the strike near or above the closing stock price on the trade initiation day. The initial investment for the ASP strategies applied to a stock varies somewhat from $10,000. This is because the number of shares was rounded to the nearest 100 as a CBOE equity option contract is for 100 shares.
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